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1 Introduction
About three quarters of carbon emissions are caused by the combustion of
fossil fuels. Policies for reducing carbon emissions must therefore to a large
extent be policies that a⁄ect fossil fuel markets. In much of the policy dis-
cussion and some of the academic literature it is assumed, usually implicitly,
that the producer prices of fossil fuels are una⁄ected by policies directed to-
ward these markets. As shown already by Bohm (1993), endogenizing fuel
prices by including the supply side of fossil fuel markets may be important for
studying consequences of climate policies. While Bohm￿ s analysis did not ex-
plicitly include the dynamic features of the supply side of fossil fuel markets,
an early contribution on such dynamic features was given by Sinclair (1992).
Sinclair pointed out that "the key decision of those lucky enough to own oil-
wells is not so much how much to produce as when to extract it." Since then,
there has been a considerable number of contributions discussing optimal
climate policy with explicit attention given to the non-renewable character
of carbon resources. These contributions either assume a constraint on the
amount of carbon in the atmosphere (Chakravorty et al. 2006, 2008, 2011)
or explicitly include a climate cost function in the analysis (Ulph and Ulph,
1992; Withagen, 1994; Tahvonen, 1995; Farzin and Tahvonen, 1996; Hoel
and Kverndokk, 1996). One of the insights from the literature is that the
principles for setting an optimal carbon tax (or price of carbon quotas) are
the same as when the limited availability of carbon resources is ignored: At
any time, the optimal price of carbon emissions should be equal to the present
value of all future climate costs caused by present emissions, often called the
social cost of carbon.
During the last couple of years, there has been a renewed interest in
analyzing climate policy with explicit attention given to the non-renewable
character of carbon resources. Much of this later literature discusses the so-
called "green paradox", a term stemming from Sinn (2008a,b). Sinn argues
that some designs of climate policy, intended to mitigate carbon emissions,
2might actually increase carbon emissions, at least in the short run. Sinn￿ s
point is that if e.g. a carbon tax rises su¢ ciently rapidly, pro￿t maximizing
resource owners will bring forward the extraction of their resources. Hence,
in the absence of carbon capture and storage (CCS), carbon emissions in-
crease.1A thorough analysis of the e⁄ects of taxation on resource extraction
was given by Long and Sinn (1985), but without explicitly discussing climate
e⁄ects. More recently, Hoel (2010a,b) has studied the relationship between
carbon taxes and carbon extraction emphasizing the fact that governments
in practise cannot commit to future tax rates.
A rapidly increasing carbon tax is not the only possible cause of a green
paradox. A declining price of a substitute, either because of increasing subsi-
dies or technological improvement, can give the same e⁄ect: see e.g. Strand
(2007), Gerlagh (2011), Grafton et al. (2010), and van der Ploeg and With-
agen (2010).
As mentioned above, Sinn used the term "green paradox" to describe a sit-
uation where policies intending to mitigate climate change actually increase
near-term emissions. Gerlagh (2011) uses the term "weak green paradox" for
such a phenomenon, and uses the term "strong green paradox" to describe a
situation where policies intending to mitigate climate change increase total
climate costs. This distinction is important, since total climate costs depend
not only on near-term emissions, but also on all future emissions. One can
therefore imagine policies that increase near-term emissions, but that never-
theless reduce future emissions so much that total climate costs decline.
In almost all of the literature referred to above, the economy analyzed
is a single unit, which in the context of climate policy seems reasonable to
interpret as the whole world.2 Policies, whether they are optimal or not,
are thus implicitly assumed to be the same throughout the world. This is
in sharp contrast to reality: Carbon taxes and other climate policies di⁄er
1Throuout this paper, CCS is ignored. Discussions of climate policy when there is a
possibility of CCS and when the carbon resource scarcity is taken into considereation have
been given by Amigues et al. (2010), Le Kama et al. (2009) and Hoel and Jensen (2010).
2Papers considering two or more countries in the context of the green paradox include
Eichner and Pethig (2009) and Grafton et al. (2010). None of these discuss the e⁄ects of
exogenous tax changes or cost reductions, as the present paper does.
3substantially across countries. In most countries there are no carbon taxes
and not much other climate policy. Many countries actually have quite large
explicit or implicit subsidies of fossil fuels.3 In contrast, several states in the
US and all EU countries have various types of climate policies. In the EU
there is a quota system covering a considerable amount of carbon emissions,
which from 2013 will be widened further. The quota price today is about
15 Euro per tonne of CO2. Several European countries also have carbon
taxes for the parts of the economy not covered by the quota system. For
instance, Sweden has a carbon tax of up to over 100 Euro per tonne of
CO2, and Norway has a carbon tax varying from 12 to 48 Euro per tonne
of CO2 for a considerable part of the economy not covered by the EU quota
system. Moreover, many European countries also have other climate policies
that supplement the quota system or the carbon tax, such as subsidies to
renewable substitutes for fossil fuels.
With this motivation, the present paper considers a simple two-country
economy where countries di⁄er with respect to their climate policies.4 The
di⁄erences between countries may be in either carbon taxes (sections 3-6)
or in subsidies (section 6). There is a given initial stock of a homogeneous
carbon resource with a constant unit extraction cost, set to zero for simplicity.
There is also a perfect substitute for the resource, supplied competitively at
a constant unit cost. The producer price of the carbon resource increases at
the rate of interest in accordance with the Hotelling rule. In each country,
the carbon resource is the only energy source as long as the consumer price
of the resource is lower than the price of the substitute, while the substitute
is the only energy source once the consumer price has reached the price of
the substitute.
Section 2 gives a brief discussion of climate costs, and shows that for a
speci￿c set of assumptions the social cost of carbon will be constant over
3According to a recent IEA report, total world direct subsidies of fossil fuels amount
to $312 billion in 2009, and eliminating these subsidies would cut global carbon emissions
by about 7% (see http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/docs/second_joint_report.pdf)
4In a previous version of the paper I assumed several countries. However, going from
two to many adds to complexity without giving much new insight.
4time. While this feature is used in the formal analysis, most results will
also hold under the much weaker assumption that the social cost of carbon
increases at a rate less than the rate of interest.
Section 3 presents the basic model for the carbon resource, and section 4
analyzes the e⁄ects of increased carbon taxes. Whatever their level, carbon
tax rates are assumed to be constant. In a world of homogeneous countries
an increase in a common tax rate would move resource extraction form the
present to the future, and hence reduce climate costs. With heterogeneous
countries the e⁄ects of increased taxes are not so simple. In particular, we
￿nd that if the carbon tax is raised in the country that initially has the lowest
tax rate, resource extraction may be speeded up, implying increased climate
costs. In this case we hence have a strong green paradox.
Section 5 analyzes the e⁄ects of a reduction in the cost of the renewable
substitute. In a world of homogeneous countries such a cost reduction will
move resource extraction from the future to the present, see Gerlagh (2011).
Hence, we get a weak and a strong green paradox in this case. With het-
erogeneous countries the e⁄ects of lower costs for the renewable substitute
are not so simple. We get a weak green paradox also in this case. However,
if the carbon tax rates di⁄er su¢ ciently between countries and demand is
su¢ ciently price inelastic, total climate costs may decline as a consequence
of the cost reduction. Hence there is no strong green paradox in this case.
Finally, section 6 analyzes the consequences of subsidizing the renewable
substitute. With a common subsidy, the e⁄ect on climate costs of an in-
creased subsidy is the same as the e⁄ect of a cost reduction, while the e⁄ects
on social welfare di⁄er between the two cases. If countries initially have dif-
ferent subsidies, the e⁄ects of increasing a subsidy in one of the countries
are di⁄erent from a cost reduction a⁄ecting both countries. In particular,
increasing a subsidy always gives a weak green paradox, and also a strong
green paradox if the subsidy is increased in the country that initially has the
lowest subsidy.
52 Climate costs and carbon resource extrac-
tion
In the subsequent analysis, it is assumed that the total amount of carbon re-
sources are given, and that all of this carbon will eventually be extracted and
thus emitted into the atmosphere. Total emissions over all future years are
hence given. In spite of this, the pro￿le of the carbon extraction is important
from a climate point of view. A rapid increase of carbon in the atmosphere
will gradually decline over time, as it is transferred to other sinks. However,
a signi￿cant portion (about 25% according to e.g. Archer, 2005) remains in
the atmosphere for ever (or at least for thousands of years). If a ￿xed amount
of carbon, denoted G0; is extracted over any time period, this will therefore
give a long-run increase of about G0=4 in the atmosphere. With a su¢ ciently
slow rate of carbon extraction, carbon in the atmosphere will grow gradually
and monotonically until its long-run level S￿ is reached. This is illustrated by
curve A in Figure 1, where S(0) is the amount of carbon in the atmosphere
at our initial date 0 (so S￿ ￿ S(0) + G0=4)5. Clearly, such a development
of carbon in the atmosphere will be associated with a gradually changing
climate. With a higher rate of extraction, the carbon in the atmosphere will
increase more rapidly, and will overshoot its long-run value S￿, as curve B in
Figure 1. This will give a considerably faster climate change, probably with
temperatures above the slow extraction path for several centuries. One can
argue strongly that the climate costs associated with the rapid extraction
path are much higher than the climate costs associated with the climate de-
velopment associated with the slow extraction path. This seems particularly
likely if some e⁄ects of climate changes are irreversible, and if the speed of
climate change is also an important consideration.6
To capture the ideas above, let climate costs at time t be an increasing and
convex function of the stock of carbon in the atmosphere above preindustrial
5Strictly speaking, S(0) is the long-run level of carbon in the atmosphere if emissions
were zero for t ￿ 0.
6Tahvonen (1995), Hoel and Isaksen (1995), and Hoel and Kverndokk (1996) explicitly
consider the speed of climate change in their analyses.
6level, denoted C(S(t)). Moreover, we follow Farzin and Tahvonen (1996) and
arti￿cially split S into two components S1 + S2: component 1 that remains
in the atmosphere for ever and component 2 that gradually depreciates at
a rate ￿. For each unit emitted the share that remains in the atmosphere
for ever is denoted ￿. The amount of 1 unit of carbon emissions at time t
remaining in the atmosphere at ￿(> t) is thus ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)e￿￿(￿￿t). If e.g.
￿ = 0:013 and ￿ = 0:25, 45 % of the original emissions will remain in the
atmosphere after 100 years, while 27 % still remains after 300 years. These
numbers are roughly in line with what is suggested by Archer (2005) and
others.
Consider next the climate damage caused by 1 unit of emissions at time
t. The total additional damage caused by 1 unit of carbon emissions at time
t is the sum of additional damages at all dates from t to in￿nity caused by
the additional stocks from t to in￿nity. To get from additional stocks at ￿ to
additional damages at ￿ we must multiply the additional stocks at ￿ by the
marginal damage at ￿, which is C0(S1(￿) + S2(￿)). The marginal damage of
1 additional unit of emissions at t, often denoted the social cost of carbon,






￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)e
￿￿(￿￿t)￿
C
0(S1(￿) + S2(￿))d￿ (1)
For C00 > 0 the social cost of carbon will vary over time. While S1(￿)
is increasing as long as emissions are positive, S2(￿) may be declining for
su¢ ciently low emissions. In any case , C0 and hence v(t) will change over
time.7 To simplify the formal analysis I assume that C00 = 0, i.e. that












7Farzin and Tahvonen (1996) give a detailed analysis of how v(t) might develop over
time when C00 > 0.
7which is constant over time. While a constant v simpli￿es the welfare analy-
sis, most of the subsequent results remain valid also under the much weaker
assumption that the present value e￿rtv(t) is declining over time.
The level and time pro￿le of the carbon tax is not the issue of this paper.
Nevertheless, a few points are worth mentioning. If the constant value of v is
su¢ ciently high, none of the resource will be extracted. The optimal outcome
is to immediately satisfy the whole energy demand by the renewable substi-
tute. For lower values of v, all of the available resource will be extracted, and
extracted more rapidly the lower is v. With a time-varying v(t) this result
may be modi￿ed. In particular, if the level of a growing v(t) is su¢ ciently
high, the resource rent will be driven to zero (as it will for a constant high v),
but some of the resource will nevertheless be extracted before it is optimal to
switch to the substitute (Hoel, 2010b). Moreover, even if v is constant total
resource extraction may be declining in v if extraction costs are increasing
with cumulative extraction (van der Ploeg and Withagen, 2010; Gerlagh,
2011; Hoel ,2010b).
In a optimal world all countries would have a carbon tax equal to v. How-
ever, there are many reasons why actual carbon tax rates may be below v.
The most obvious reason is that there is little or no international cooperation
on climate policy. With n identical countries, the non-cooperative outcome
would be for each country to set its carbon tax equal to v
n, provided each
country acts individually rational as often assumed by economists. There
are in addition also various distributional and other policy reasons for actual
taxes to di⁄er from their optimal values. These other factors may vary con-
siderably across countries, implying carbon tax rates that di⁄er substantially
across countries. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the reasons
for such tax di⁄erences in more detail; I simply assume that tax rates di⁄er
across countries, as they do in the real world.
3 The market for fossil fuels
The market for fossil fuels is modeled as a market for a homogeneous non-
renewable carbon resource, given in ￿xed supply and with no extraction
8costs. The resource is supplied by competitive owners of the resource, and
the equilibrium producer price p(t) therefore rises at the interest rate r as
long as there are any remaining reserves.
The demand for carbon is given as the sum of demand from two countries.
There is a perfect substitute for the carbon resource, supplied competitively
at its unit cost b. Countries have identical gross utility functions depending
on the sum of the use of carbon and the substitute, u(x + y), where x and
y are the use of carbon and the substitute, respectively. The corresponding
demand function is D(Q) satisfying u0 (D(Q)) = Q, where Q is the consumer
price of the resource or substitute. As long as Q < b consumers will consume
the resource, but will switch to the substitute when Q = b. The producer
price of the carbon resource develops according to the Hotelling rule, and is
thus p0ert. The two countries have exogenous and constant carbon taxes q1
and q2, respectively, with q1 > q2. The consumer price in country i is hence
p0ert + qi until this price reaches b.
To sum up, the demand for the resource and substitute in the two coun-






and yi(t) = 0 for t < Ti (3)
xi(t) = 0 and yi(t) = D(b) for t ￿ Ti (4)
with Ti determined by
p0e
rTi + qi = b (5)




[x1(t) + x2(t)]dt = G0 (6)
The four equations above determine the resource extraction paths for any
given values of the exogenous variables q1, q2, and b. The next sections show
how changes in these variables a⁄ect the outcome, and also discuss welfare
9e⁄ects of such changes.
4 Increased carbon taxes
In the Appendix it is shown that di⁄erentiation of (3)-(6) w.r.t. qi gives (for























































dt < 0 (11)
H = ￿rp0e
r(T1+T2) [2D(b) ￿ rp0A] < 0 (12)
It is useful to ￿rst consider the case in which both countries initially have










Hence, an increase in the common tax rate will for sure extent the period
of extraction. This result is well-known from the theory of non-renewable
resources: An increased constant tax rate will make the consumer price path
10￿ atter, and therefore also the extraction path ￿ atter. Extraction is therefore
postponed in time as a consequence of such a tax increase, which in turn
reduces climate costs when the present value of the social cost of carbon
declines over time.
Consider next the case of increasing the tax in one country, say country
i, when q1 > q2 initially, implying T2 > T1. It follows from (7) that any tax
increase will reduce the resource rent. Moreover, it follows from (8) that a
tax increase in one country will always increase the extraction period in the
other country. The reason for this is that the tax increase lowers the time
path of the producer price. For country j (which is not increasing its tax) it
therefore now takes a longer time for the consumer price to move from p0+qj
to b, when the country switches from the resource to the substitute. The total
resource use in country j therefore also increases, leaving less total resource
use to country i that increases its tax. This tends to make the extraction
period in country i go down. However, the fact that country i has increased
its tax works in the opposite direction: With a higher tax the consumer price
path is ￿ attened, tending to move resource use from the present to the future.




dqi > 0 the e⁄ects of a tax increase in one country are similar to an
increase in a common tax rate: The use of the resource is postponed in both
countries, which in turn reduces climate costs when the present value of the
social cost of carbon declines over time.
The case of
dTi
dqi < 0 is more interesting. Assume ￿rst that the high-tax
country increases its tax, i.e. q1 is increased. For
dT1
dq1 < 0, T1 goes down while
T2 increases. Since T2 > T1 initially, the total period of extraction increases,
as it did in the case of an increased common tax rate. If instead the low-tax
country increases its tax, T1 will increase and T2 will decline if
dT2
dq2 < 0. In
this case the total extraction period is shortened, which tends to increase
climate costs if the present value of the social cost of carbon declines over
time. To illustrate this case further, it is useful to consider the limiting case
of completely inelastic demand, i.e. D0 = 0.





H < 0, where
11D is the demand for the resource or substitute in each country. The e⁄ect
on resource extraction of an increase in q2 is illustrated in Figure 2. Until
T 0
1, the resource is used in both countries. At T 0
1 country 1 (which has the
highest tax) switches to the substitute, while country 2 continues to use the
resource until it is exhausted at T 0
2. If country 2 increases its tax the date
of resource depletion is reduced to T ￿
2, while the period of resource use in
country 1 is extended till T ￿
1. Since total resource extraction is given, the
squares A and B in Figure 2 are of equal size. Resource extraction of this size
is moved from a later to an earlier period, clearly increasing climate costs if
the present value of the social cost of carbon declines over time.
With a constant social cost of carbon, denoted v, total climate costs are






The change in emissions described by Figure 2 clearly increases ￿ since r > 0.
While a completely inelastic demand is unrealistic, continuity implies that ￿
will increase as the carbon tax in the low-tax country also for a su¢ ciently
small positive value of ￿D0. Hence, the following Proposition follows:
Proposition 1 If the demand for the resource plus substitute is su¢ ciently
price inelastic, total climate costs will increase if the carbon tax is increased
in the country that initially has the lowest tax.
Notice that this proposition will hold even if the social cost of carbon is
not constant as assumed in (13). As long as the present value of the social
cost of carbon is declining over time, early emissions are worse for the climate
than later emissions. Therefore total climate costs will increase also under
this less restrictive assumption if the conditions in Proposition 1 hold. The
same is true for the subsequent propositions.
How relevant is Proposition 1 in a more realistic setting of many countries
instead of only two? To answer this, it is again useful to consider the limiting
case of completely inelastic demand. For this case each country￿ s resource use
is its demand over the time period it takes for the country￿ s consumer price
12to go from p0 +qj to b. As one country i reduces its carbon tax, p0 declines,
implying that Tj increases for all other countries. The reduced resource use by
the country that increases its tax is thus moved to all other countries. Some
of these countries may have higher taxes than the country increasing its tax,
and the move in resource use to them will increase climate costs de￿ned by
￿. However, there may also be countries having lower carbon taxes than the
country increasing its tax. The move in resource use to these countries will
reduce climate costs de￿ned by ￿. The net a⁄ect on ￿ is ambiguous. The
possibility of climate costs increasing seems more likely the lower the initial
tax is in the country increasing its tax, since this means that more of the
resource use is moved to higher tax countries and hence used earlier.
Climate costs are only one component of a country￿ s total welfare. To
study the e⁄ects of a tax increase on a country￿ s total welfare, we return to






u(xj(t) + yj(t)) ￿ byj(t) + e





The ￿rst two terms in curly brackets give utility from resource and sub-
stitute use minus the costs of substitute production. The third term is the
value of country j￿ s net export of the resource, if country j owns a share ￿j
of the resource. Each country is assumed to bear half of the total climate
costs, giving the green welfare term ￿￿
2 for both countries.
Di⁄erentiating Wj w.r.t. qi and using the fact that yj = 0 for u0 =




















The ￿rst term is a pure terms of trade e⁄ect; if ￿1 + ￿2 = 1 these terms
vanish when we sum over the two countries. The second term re￿ ects that
a carbon tax gives a distortion in the economy if climate e⁄ects are ignored.
As the time path of resource use is changed due to a change in a carbon tax,
13we get a negative or positive welfare e⁄ect, depending on how this time path
is changed. Finally, the last term is the change in the country￿ s climate costs.


















































for large t. Since r > 0 the integral is therefore negative, implying that the
whole expression is positive for q < v. The welfare maximizing carbon tax is
of course the Pigovian rate q = v. We can summarize this (rather obvious)
result as follows:
Proposition 2 Increasing a common carbon tax will reduce climate costs,
and will also increase social welfare in both countries if the common tax rate
initially is below the Pigovian tax rate.
When tax rates di⁄er, there is not much in general one can say about
welfare e⁄ects of changing one tax rate. However, if d￿
dqi > 0, the last term in
(14) and (15) may dominate all other terms if v is su¢ ciently large, since ￿
is proportional to v. From Proposition 1 it therefore follows
Proposition 3 If the social cost of carbon is su¢ ciently high, and demand
for the resource plus substitute is su¢ ciently price inelastic, total welfare for
both countries will decline if the carbon tax is increased in the country that
initially has the lowest tax.
From the discussion after proposition 1 it is clear that welfare may decline
for all countries in a multi-country setting if the carbon tax raised in a country
that initially has a relatively low tax rate.
145 Lower costs of producing the substitute


























Notice that the initial consumer price in both countries goes down as
b is reduced. Hence, near-term emissions increase, so we get a weak green
paradox. As we shall see below, total climate costs may nevertheless decline,
in which case there is no strong green paradox.
It is useful to ￿rst consider the case in which both countries initially have







Hence, a reduction in b will for sure shorten the period of extraction. This
result is well-known from the theory of non-renewable resources: A lower
cost of a substitute will reduce the price path of the resource, and hence
speed up resource use. It is straightforward to see that this result remains
valid for positive but small tax di⁄erences, implying a small value for T2￿T1.
The change in the extraction path implied by the reduction in b will increase
climate costs when the present value of the social cost of carbon declines over
time. As we shall see below, total welfare may nevertheless increase.
When tax rates di⁄er, a lower renewable cost will for sure speed up ex-
traction in the high-tax country. However, resource extraction lasts until T2,
and the direction in which T2 moves as b is reduced is ambiguous. If
dT2
db < 0,
the total period of extraction will increase as b is reduced. In this case the
reduction in b will give increased early emissions (since p0 goes down), and
increased late emissions (since T2 increases), and hence lower medium term
15emissions (from the resource constraint). It is thus not obvious how climate
costs are a⁄ected by the reduction in b.
To illustrate the possibility of
dT2
db < 0, it is useful to again consider
the limiting case of completely inelastic demand, i.e. D0 = 0, implying





H > 0, where D
is the demand for the resource or substitute in each country. The e⁄ect on
resource extraction of a reduction in b is similar to what we found in Figure 2,
except now the initial switch dates are given by T ￿
1 and T ￿
2, while the switch
dates after the reduction in b are given by T 0
1 and T 0
2. Some of the resource
extraction is thus moved from A to B, reducing climate costs if the present
value of the social cost of carbon declines over time.
From the analysis above the following proposition immediately follows:
Proposition 4 If the di⁄erences in carbon tax rates are su¢ ciently small,
total climate costs increase if the cost of the substitute declines. For larger
di⁄erences in carbon tax rates, this need not be true. In particular, if demand
for the resource plus substitute is su¢ ciently price inelastic, total climate
costs will decline if the cost of the substitute declines.
The e⁄ect of reduced b on total welfare is found by proceeding as we did



















The ￿rst term, which is negative, is the direct e⁄ect of a change in b. This
term tends to make welfare increase as b is reduced. The second and third
term have exactly the same interpretation as in (14).
For the case of a common tax rate q = q1 = q2 the total welfare change

















From the reasoning above it is clear that both integrals are negative. If q = v,
it follows that welfare increases as b declines. However, if q < v, we cannot
16rule out the possibility that the increased climate costs that are implied by
a reduction in b dominate the positive direct e⁄ect.
Proposition 5 If carbon taxes in both countries are at the Pigovian rate, a
lower cost of the substitute is welfare enhancing for both countries. With a
lower common tax rate welfare for both countries will decline if the cost of the
substitute is reduced, provided the social cost of carbon is su¢ ciently high.
Turning next to the case di⁄erent tax rates, there are not many general
conclusions regarding overall social welfare. Perhaps the most interesting
case is the case described in proposition 4, implying that lower b may reduce
climate costs. In particular, if d￿
db > 0 and q2 is su¢ ciently low, it is clear
from (20) that
dW2
db < 0, while the sign of
dW1
db will depend on q1. This gives
the following proposition:
Proposition 6 If the tax rate in the low-tax country is su¢ ciently low and
demand for the resource plus substitute is su¢ ciently price inelastic, a reduced
cost of the substitute will increase welfare in the low-tax country. The sign
of the welfare change in the high-tax country will depend on the tax rate in
this country and on the social cost of carbon.
6 Subsidizing the renewable substitute
In the previous section, the cost reduction of the renewable substitute was
a real cost reduction. Alternatively, one could consider a cost reduction to
the users of the substitute caused by a subsidy ￿ reducing the private cost
of the substitute from b to b ￿ ￿. Notice that such a subsidy in this model
is a promise or commitment from the government to hold the future price of
the substitute at b ￿ ￿. There may be good reason to believe that such a
promise or commitment is not credible, as it may be in the interests of the
governments to terminate the subsidy once the carbon resource is depleted. It
is nevertheless useful to consider how such a subsidy works if it were possible
to convince resource owners that the subsidy would continue "for ever", or
at least su¢ ciently beyond the date of resource depletion.
17Consider ￿rst a common subsidy ￿. The e⁄ects on resource extraction of
increasing ￿ are identical to the e⁄ects of a reduction in b. The results in the
previous section up to and including proposition 4 therefore remain valid.
However, the welfare e⁄ects of increasing ￿ di⁄er from the welfare e⁄ects of
a reduction in b. The di⁄erence is in the ￿rst term in (20). Clearly, this
term vanishes when the reduction in b ￿ ￿ is not caused by a reduction in
b, but instead an increase in ￿. Instead, if ￿ initially is positive, we get a
term similar to the second term in (20). The exact expression is (ignoring as





















For the case of a common tax rate q = q1 = q2 the total welfare change


























The term in square brackets in the ￿rst integral is positive: An increased
subsidy implies an earlier start of the use of the subsidy, and once it is used
a larger subsidy implies larger use. If q = v, it follows that welfare decreases
as the subsidy is increased. The second integral is positive, since an increase
in the subsidy will speed up carbon extraction. For any q ￿ v, the whole
expression is hence negative:
Proposition 7 If carbon taxes in the two countries are equal and do not
exceed the Pigovian tax rate, subsidizing the renewable substitute will for sure
lower social welfare in both countries.
Notice that this proposition implies that introducing a small positive tax
on the substitute in this case would increase social welfare, as also pointed
out by van der Ploeg and Withagen (2010).
Turning next to the case of di⁄erent tax rates, there are not many general
conclusions regarding overall social welfare. Perhaps the most interesting case
18is the case described in proposition 4, implying that higher ￿ may reduce
climate costs. In particular, if d￿
d￿ < 0, and ￿ and q2 are su¢ ciently small,
it is clear from (20) that
dW2
d￿ > 0, while the sign of
dW1
db will depend on q1.
This gives the following proposition:
Proposition 8 If the tax rate in the low-tax country is su¢ ciently low and
demand for the resource plus substitute is su¢ ciently price inelastic, the in-
troduction of a small subsidy for the renewable substitute will increase welfare
in the low-tax country. The sign of the welfare change in the high-tax country
will depend on the tax rate in this country and on the social cost of carbon.
Finally, it is useful to consider the case where carbon taxes are equal in
the two countries, but subsidies may di⁄er. For this case equations (3)-(4)






and yi(t) = 0 for t < Ti (24)
xi(t) = 0 and yi(t) = D(b ￿ ￿i) for t ￿ Ti (25)
with Ti determined by
p0e
rTi + q = b ￿ ￿i (26)

















erTj [D(b ￿ ￿j) ￿ rp0A]
H
< 0 (29)
An increased subsidy in any country will reduce the initial consumer
price in both countries. Just like for a reduction in b, near-term emissions
19therefore increase, giving a weak green paradox. If the subsidy in country
1 is increased, the total period of extraction is increased (since
dT2
d￿1 > 0).
In this case the increased subsidy will give increased early emissions (since
p0 goes down), and increased late emissions (since T2 increases), and hence
lower medium term emissions (from the resource constraint). It is thus not
obvious how climate costs are a⁄ected by the increased subsidy.
If instead the subsidy in country 2 is increased, the total period of extrac-
tion is shortened. Moreover, total extraction at any point of time up to the
exhaustion date must go up, since the consumer price path becomes lower in
both countries. This immediately gives the following proposition:
Proposition 9 If the subsidy is increased in the country that initially has
the lowest subsidy, total climate costs increase.
For the same reason as for a carbon tax increase in a single county, this
result is relevant also in a more realistic setting of many countries instead of
only two: Each country￿ s resource use is its demand over the time period it
takes for the country￿ s consumer price to go from p0 + q to b ￿ ￿j. As one
country i increases its subsidy, p0 declines, implying that Tj increases for all
other countries. The reduced resource use by the country that increases its
subsidy is thus moved to all other countries. Some of these countries may
have higher subsidies than the country increasing its tax, and the move in
resource use to them will increase climate costs de￿ned by ￿. However, there
may also be countries having lower subsidies than the country increasing its
subsidy. The move in resource use to these countries will reduce climate
costs de￿ned by ￿. The net a⁄ect on ￿ is ambiguous. The possibility of
climate costs increasing seems more likely the lower the initial subsidy is in
the country increasing its subsidy, as this means that more of the resource
use is moved to higher subsidy countries and hence used earlier.
To simplify the discussion of total welfare, assume that the common car-















20The integral in (30) is positive for the country that increases its subsidy
(since it switches to the substitute earlier and uses more of the substitute
as a consequence of the increased subsidy) but negative for the other county
(since it delays its switch to the substitute as a consequence of the increased
subsidy). These results can be summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 10 Assume that both countries have zero carbon taxes but pos-
itive subsidies. An increased subsidy will reduce social welfare excluding cli-
mate costs in the county that increases its subsidy, but increase social welfare
excluding climate costs in the other county. Since climate costs increase if the
low-subsidy country increase its subsidy, total social welfare for this country
will decline as it increases its subsidy.
7 Conclusions
The analysis above is done with an extremely simple model. Perhaps the
most drastic simpli￿cation is that carbon resources are homogeneous, and
have constant unit costs up to a physical upper limit on total extraction. A
much more realistic assumption would be to let extraction costs be rising in
cumulative extraction. van der Ploeg and Withagen (2010), Gerlagh (2011)
and Hoel (2010a,b) have shown that the e⁄ects on emission paths of changes
in carbon taxes and costs of a renewable substitute may depend signi￿cantly
on the properties of the extraction cost function. Moreover, the extraction
cost function may di⁄er between di⁄erent types of fossil fuels.
A second drastic simpli￿cation is that the substitute for the carbon re-
source was assumed to be a perfect substitute, and that it had a constant
unit cost of production. Relaxing these assumptions may change the conclu-
sion that a lower cost of the substitute will speed up extraction in a world of
homogeneous countries, see e.g. van der Ploeg and Withagen (2010), Grafton
et al. (2010), and Gerlagh (2011).
The focus of the present paper has been to show that the degree of country
heterogeneity may signi￿cantly a⁄ect the relationship between carbon taxes,
costs and subsidies on the one hand and emission paths on the other hand.
21To focus on this issue it has been useful to keep the model as simple as
possible in all other dimensions. The analysis has shown that the e⁄ects on
emission paths of changes in taxes, costs and subsidies may be very di⁄erent
in a world of heterogeneous countries than one would ￿nd in a hypothetical
world of identical countries. Although details will di⁄er, it seems reasonable
to expect similar di⁄erences also in more general models of carbon resources
with a substitute.
Appendix: Changes in taxes, costs, and subsi-
dies

















which together with the two equations (26) give three equations determining



























































and A and Bi are as de￿ned by (10) and (11) but with the subsidy rates
included in the demand function.
These equations give (7)-(9) and (27)-(29), where H , de￿ned by (12)
with the subsidy rates included, is the determinant of the matrix M.









































which is identical to (17)-(19).
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Figure 1: Carbon in the atmosphere for alternative emission paths 
 
 
Figure 2: The effect on the extraction path of reduced cost of the substitute 
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